

Procedural Regulation of Information Content Review Rules of Network Platforms

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Abstract. Online platform information content review rules are the normative basis for platforms to regulate their internal activities and ensure the security of online information content. They are also an important object for platforms to perform their governance responsibilities under the co-governance order and should be reasonably established on the basis of complying with legal provisions. In order to exercise the private power of censorship of illegal information content, online platforms establish rules for censorship of information content based on legal authorization and their own influence, and the operation of this rule should conform to the standard of procedural justice. Specifically, the process of formulating the rules should be transparent while guaranteeing the user's right to participate, and the basic due procedures should be guaranteed in advance when making decisions based on the rules. At the same time, platforms should be required to establish a reasonable content review mechanism. The improvement of the relevant procedures of the information content review rules can enhance the credibility of the platform rules, thereby ensuring the platform autonomy and network governance environment.

Keywords: content review rules; due process; user participation; transparency

1. Introduction

With the continuous development of the information society, the scope of people's activities has expanded from the traditional real space to the network virtual space. As a product of the development of the internet, the network platform has improved the efficiency and convenience of people's production and life, but it has also brought new problems. In order to strengthen the ecological governance of network information content, China has shifted from the traditional governance model of "government-individual" to the ternary governance model of "government-network platform-individual". Network platforms have

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become the main role in network governance. It is necessary to exercise its power and regulate platform activities, and information content review rules for regulating illegal information and violations have emerged. Online platforms take censorship rules as the main basis for regulating the network environment. Therefore, only by ensuring the procedural legitimacy of censorship rules can ensure the fairness and authority of platform information content censorship.

2. The private power attribute of online platform information content review

The capital attribute of the network platform means that its fundamental purpose is profit-seeking, and public interest is an incidental requirement, which is fundamentally different from social public power. At the same time, although the relationship between the platform and users seems to originate from an equal commercial contractual relationship, whether it is from the unilateral formulation of platform rules, the mandatory signing of service agreements, or the disposal of illegal acts, it all highlights "private governance" non-equality between the platform and users. The non-equivalence of the subject's identity is the difference between "power" and "right". Therefore, platform power is not a private right in the traditional sense, nor is it a social public power authorized by law. The behavior of online platforms information content censorship has the attribute of private power. Private power is the dominance and influence that a private subject has over another private subject in terms of rights and freedoms. In the internet age, the network platform has gained enormous power to influence the public order and private rights and interests based on the technical resources and information resources it enjoys, forming the actual domination and influence on the network information market. [1]

According to the information content review obligation configured by the legislation, the online platform has obtained the discretion to review whether the information content posted by the user is illegal, and obtained the right to control the user because of the platform agreement signed with the user. Network platforms play the role of network information regulators by means of qualification review, information management and control, illegal processing, and information disclosure of information circulation, and in fact undertake the public functions of maintaining the order of network information circulation and protecting the rights and interests of users. In order to maintain the power to control a large number of users, the platform conducts network information regulation by formulating and implementing platform norms and adjudicating disputes in accordance with the norms, forming the power expression form of "quasi-legislative power", "quasi-administrative power" and "quasi-judicial power". Finally, establish a complete information content regulation system. [2] First, in order to ensure the operation of the platform, all platforms have established their own platform rules in accordance with the law. For different information content and different information circulation stages, the

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platform establishes, revises and abolishes different types of platform rules and exercises "quasi-legislative power". Once users choose to use the platform, they must follow the platform rules, perform the obligations stipulated by the platform and accept the corresponding treatment measures. Second, the platforms have the authority to restrict and delete the illegal information found in the management process according to the platform specifications, deal with the illegal behavior of users, and exercise "quasi-administrative power". Third, the platform exercises "quasi-judicial power" by establishing a complaint and reporting mechanism, providing a complaint review procedure, and setting up a dispute resolution system. Taking Sina Microblog as an example, in order to effectively control illegal information and maintain platform order, it has formulated various platform rules such as the "Microblog Community Convention", "Microblog Community Entertainment Information Management Regulations" and "Credit History Rules"; based on the above rules, The platform can take measures such as deleting information, reducing credit score, terminating account use, etc., and resolve user disputes through arbitration system, community committee judgment and trial. Considering the cost of litigation and the damage to their own rights, users often accept the processing results made by the platform, which means that the platform's "quasi-judicial power" can achieve the effect similar to the final judgment of the court to a large extent. Based on this, the information content review of the network platform actually has the attribute of power. The online platform information content review rules are the externalized manifestation of the platform's information content review power. They are privately formulated and implemented by the platform according to its review power and are used to regulate the internal illegal information activities and violations of the platform. [3] The private power of the platform has fully penetrated the process of formulating and implementing the censorship rules, which is essentially different from the "autonomy of will" in the traditional contract signing.

3. Procedural issues in the operation of the rules for reviewing information content of online platforms

The principle of due process is the basic principle of administrative agencies when they make administrative acts. When administrative agencies make administrative acts that have an adverse impact on the rights and interests of administrative counterparts, they must follow due process, including explaining to the counterparties the reasons and basis for the administrative acts, listening to the statement and defense of the counterparty, provide the counterparty with corresponding relief channels, and protect the legitimate rights and interests of the administrative counterparty by following the due process of law. [4] Due process protections in the network platform means that when the network platform exercises the power of reviewing information content in accordance with the platform rules, in order to protect the rights and interests of users, it must follow the corresponding

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protection procedures. Including the establishment of censorship rules to ensure user participation and transparency of the rules, prior notification is required before relevant information is blocked or deleted, the basis and reasons for the behavior are explained to the user, and the user's defense is heard. This is because, as a private subject, online platforms have huge control powers, and are prone to abuse of power. As an external manifestation of this private power, censorship rules have the following procedural problems.

3.1. The establishment of online platform review rules lacks the effective participation of users

On the one hand, the formulation of autonomous rules lacks user participation. Every user who uses platform services needs to agree to the most basic user agreement. This agreement is a contract made in advance and unilaterally by the network platform. Users need to authorize and agree to obtain services. If they refuse to accept, the use of services will be subject to multiple restrictions or even unable to use platform services. Due to the monopoly of social platforms, users can only be forced to accept it, and the principle of informed consent cannot play its original role. Taking communication tools as an example, WeChat is currently the main communication tool in China. QQ and WeChat, which have similar functions, are both operated by Tencent. Due to the fact that most people use this communication tool to communicate, new users have to pass Authorization agrees to obtain the same service. On the other hand, the modification of autonomous rules lacks user participation. Article 34 of the "E-commerce Law of the People's Republic of China" stipulates that e-commerce platforms should publicly solicit opinions when revising their rules. However, this provision does not restrict social media. For example, the "Microblog Service Use Agreement" only configures the Microblog operator with the public obligation to modify the use agreement. Once the user refuses, he needs to bear the consequences of stopping the use. express its acceptance of the revised agreement. This agreement is an agreement that the user must accept when registering, that is, the user is required to transfer his rights at the beginning, and the user is unaware of subsequent changes to the rules. Based on this, the modification of the autonomous rules of the network platform has actually rejected the participation of users in a disguised form.

3.2. The online platform review mechanism lacks openness

Paragraph 1 of Article 9 of the "Regulations on the Ecological Governance of Network Information Content" requires the network information content service platform to formulate detailed rules for the ecological governance of network information content on its platform, including the improvement of relevant systems for information content review and the allocation of professionals, but lack of internal control of the network platform.

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Transparency requirements for auditing systems.

In the practice of information content review, the platform will show that it is actively implementing review transparency by publishing management work announcements, but its public content often only plays a declarative role and does not actually respond to the public's need for transparency. Taking Sina Microblog as an example, it will publish community management work announcements monthly through the account of the "Microblog administrator". For example, the "Microblog July 2021 Community Management Work Announcement" announced the processing of harmful information on current politics and the number of account bans, the number of illegal pornography-related information disposals, the number of false information processed, the number of rumor-refuting information, the number of accounts closed to publish pornographic-related information, the number of users The number of disputes handled, the illegal arbitration results of the community committee, etc. However, the report does not show the full picture of the review process. The specific standards for review, the handling and feedback procedures for violations, the proportion of content processed before and after the user's report, the number of users' appeal information and the corresponding number of information recovery are all lacking specific instructions. [5] The same problem also exists on the Tik Tok platform, which also publishes reports similar to the above-mentioned community management work announcements. However, the release of its video is directly determined by Tik Tok officials to determine whether it violates the regulations. The specific review process, reviewers and how to review are not made public. There is also a lack of publicity for the handling process after the author's complaint, and the company's auditors made it clear in the interview that its content auditing standards are commercial secrets, which means that the transparency of Tik Tok's content auditing process needs to be improved. This makes it impossible for users to effectively understand the platform's governance capabilities and speed, and their right to know has not been effectively guaranteed. The review operation of the network platform insiders is done secretly in the background management system. Each reviewer independently exercises authority within the scope of their duties, and different review teams have different review standards, and the procedures and standards for making review decisions are confidential. Thus, it is highly likely that platforms will consider factors beyond the law and user agreements without the public's knowledge. [6] Lack of legislative requirements for the transparency of the platform's internal audit mechanism, platform self-regulation alone will inevitably damage the procedural rights of users.

3.3. The pre-procedures of the online platform review and handling decisions are not standardized

In addition to the opaque content review process, the notification procedure before the

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decision of online platform information content review is often not guaranteed. In accordance with the relevant provisions of administrative laws and regulations, the law enforcement of administrative organs needs to protect the rights and interests of the counterparty from both substantive and procedural aspects. The entity must ensure the sufficiency of relevant evidence and legal basis, and the procedure requires it to make administrative actions under due process such as notification, hearing statement and defense. Under procedural guarantees, the counterparty has sufficient right of expression to raise objections to the legality and rationality of the entities and procedures, to demonstrate the legality of their actions, and to require administrative organs to respond to their relevant claims in a timely manner. [7] Administrative procedural justice is the core requirement of administration according to law. When exercising its functions and powers, administrative organs must, on the basis of the principle of "no action without authorization by law", give full play to their professional ability to make decisions and explain them fully, effectively and convincingly, and fully protect users' right to know and appeal.

By requiring online platforms to assume the responsibility of generally reviewing information content, administrative agencies have in effect made platforms assume the responsibility of assisting and, to a certain extent, surrogate law enforcement. This will effectively give full play to the unique technical and environmental advantages of the network platform. However, under the objective problems of the conflict between the private and public nature of the platform, and the stricter censorship of information content but accountability, the decision to censor information content under the indirect law enforcement of the platform is made. In the absence of corresponding prior guarantee procedures, users with damaged rights cannot obtain the due process protection enjoyed by administrative agencies in law enforcement.

Specifically, although the online platform must conduct information content review based on legislative provisions, the form of the platform taking measures against users is based on the user agreement signed by both parties, rather than the powers expressly granted by the law. Laws and regulations have not yet clearly stipulated the review procedures of platform information content, and the review procedures are separated from the regulation of the due process.

At the same time, when the law sets information content review obligations for platforms, it also requires them to ensure operational security, information security and many other aspects. The profit-seeking nature of capital drives the platform to reduce its own operating costs as much as possible. At this time, when the online platform conducts private governance, it will naturally try to avoid a series of costs such as evidence investigation, fact determination and negotiation with the parties. This means that the legitimacy of procedures is difficult to guarantee, and the procedural rights of Internet expression subjects are naturally eroded. [8]

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In "Shenyang v. Hangzhou Netease Leihuo Technology Co., Ltd." (Zhejiang Province Hangzhou Intermediate People's Court (2017) Zhe 01 Min Zhong No. 6401 Civil Judgment), the appellant believed that the appellee did not express in advance that the appellant's behavior was prohibited sexual behavior, and the appellee did not inform in advance of the permanent suspension of the account. The imposition of penalties with prior notice is clearly inconsistent with due process. However, the court held that, based on the autonomy of the contract, the appellee had the right to control, and that "the two parties were in a contractual dispute, and there was no prior notice clause, and the defendant's direct punishment was not inappropriate", so it rejected the appellant's claim. This kind of judgment is based on private law on the basis of acknowledging that the appellee enjoys the rights, and there is obviously a contradiction in the order of public and private law. The Tik Tok platform also lacks the guarantee procedure of prior notification in the first-level review process after the video is uploaded and released. After the platform has undergone "automation + manual" review and determined violations, it can directly take punishment measures such as deleting videos, limiting current, and banning accounts, and does not require prior notice before making a decision. The decision of the online platform to punish the user will obviously infringe the rights and interests of the user. Therefore, the basic procedural rights such as the user's right to participate, the right to know, and the right to state and defend should be guaranteed, which is the basic requirement of natural justice.

4. Procedural regulation of the operation of online platform information content review rules

The censorship of information content on online platforms should pay attention to the importance of due process. Due process has the dual functions of restricting power and protecting rights, and can effectively prevent power from infringing upon rights. Online platforms use platform rules to exercise their private power to censor information content and should follow the public law value requirement of due process. In order to prevent the abuse of the platform's private power, enhance the public's recognition of the censorship rules, and ensure the long-term operation of the "government-platform-individual" network governance mechanism, it is necessary to improve the formulation and implementation procedures of the censorship rules from the following aspects.

4. 1. Strengthen user participation in the formation of information content review rules

Enhancing user participation in the establishment of the review mechanism is an important measure to ensure that the rule-making process conforms to procedural justice. At present, more and more laws and regulations in my country put forward requirements for users to participate in the formulation of censorship rules. For example, Articles 32 to 34 of the "E-

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commerce Law" stipulate that online platforms should follow the principles of fairness, impartiality and openness when formulating platform rules. And public opinion should be solicited before amending the rules. On October 29, 2021, Article 14 of the "Guidelines for Implementing Subject Responsibilities on Internet Platforms (Draft for Comment)" issued by the State Administration for Market Regulation also requires online platforms to follow procedures such as rule formulation, revision announcement, and solicitation of opinions. However, the relevant regulations still have problems such as limited types of platforms to be regulated, and low legal hierarchy. At the same time, in the face of the heavy responsibility of reviewing information content, in practice, major online platforms are also looking for ways to "reduce the burden". Among them, the most important way is to invite users to participate in the review and processing of information content. For example, Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 of "Sina Microblog Community Committee System" clarify that Sina Microblog establishes a community committee system. The committee includes an ordinary committee and an expert committee. It establishes an ordinary committee through open recruitment and review, and then the ordinary committee is promoted to produce an expert committee. This system focuses on the review and handling of false information and harmful information, and also provides corresponding review procedures for the losing party of the handling decision. Compared with the non-disclosure of automated review, this system guarantees the user's right to know and the right to defend to a certain extent, [9] but the community committee system only guarantees the right of some users to participate in the implementation stage of the information content censorship mechanism. There is still room for improvement in terms of engagement and user engagement scale.

Therefore, in order to ensure the fairness of the platform's censorship rules, the right of users to participate in the establishment of censorship rules should be enhanced. On the one hand, rules formulated by online platforms should go through reasonable procedures such as drafting, publicizing, soliciting opinions and then releasing them. The procedures for formulating rules for online platforms may be drafted in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Electronic Commerce Law, on the basis of following the principles of fairness, impartiality and openness, and publicized within a reasonable time. If users put forward reasonable opinions, the platform rules should be improved in a timely manner, and user representatives may be required to participate in the drafting of platform rules under necessary conditions. On the other hand, online platform amendments to the rules should also go through effective procedures such as soliciting opinions, publicizing within a reasonable period, and prominently reminding. In practice, online platforms usually have set relevant censorship rules before users enter, which can directly obtain user consent and relevant authorization through user agreements, which means that the platform rules formulation process lacks the effective participation of users. In order to better protect the rights and status of users, the participation of users should be guaranteed during the long-

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term existence and revision of platform rules. Specifically, the online platform shall provide corresponding channels for users' opinions on the implementation of the rules and suggestions on the revision of the rules, and reasonably publicize the channels; for valuable opinions and suggestions, the platform shall give feedback within a reasonable time limit; for New terms and new rules after the platform has been modified or established should be placed in a prominent position on the homepage, or a reminder should be given when the user logs in. By improving the procedures for the formulation and revision of review rules, it is possible to ensure that the platform rules are more fair and just, and can be recognized and abided by relevant stakeholders. [10]

4.2. Improve the transparency of information content review rules

Since the establishment of the online platform information content censorship system, due to information asymmetry and unequal status between the platform and its users, platform autonomy has been subject to disputes such as "privatization of power", "ambiguity of audit standards" and "confidentiality of audit procedures ". In order to prevent online platforms from abusing their censorship powers, it is necessary to improve the transparency of censorship rules to promote the trust and recognition of the censorship mechanism by relevant stakeholders. Online platforms need to publicize the procedures for formulating censorship rules, review procedures, and punishment procedures in a conspicuous and reasonable manner, and accept the supervision of relevant stakeholders, thereby limiting private power and protecting public interests.

In terms of foreign legislation, Article 2 of Germany's "Network Enforcement Law" stipulates that if a social network platform receives more than 100 complaints about illegal content within a year, it should produce a report on handling complaints about illegal content every six months, and report it in the federal government. The bulletin and the home page of its own website are published. The law also lists the specific content of the report in detail in Article 2, paragraph 2, including specific measures to stop illegal acts, complaint communication mechanism, judgment criteria for deleting and blocking illegal content, number of complaints about illegal content, agency responsible for handling complaints, Personnel situation, setting of complaint points, number of external consultations, classification and sorting, processing time, notification of processing decisions, etc. [11] The British White Paper on Online Harm also stipulates that regulated platforms should produce and publish an annual transparency report, which includes the dissemination of harmful content on the platform and the relevant measures taken by the platform. In addition, regulators can request the platform to provide other relevant information according to their own needs. [12] In the practice of foreign platform autonomy, since 2018, Facebook has published transparency reports every year, disclosing content review standards, rule implementation, etc. The annual transparency report is released on

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the handling situation and responses to relevant rules, which effectively protects the public's right to know the platform's review rules. [13] The above legislative experience has great reference significance for realizing the transparency of China's online platform information content censorship rules. China should require online platforms to refine the transparent content of censorship behaviors to ensure the transparency of platform information content censorship rules. [14] Specifically, first of all, the public content of the platform should be determined, including the public review standards, review processing process, and dispute resolution mechanism and other specific content; Secondly, the frequency and degree of disclosure can be determined according to the scale of the platform, the number of users, and the platform's supervision capabilities; Finally, the content exposed by the platform should be easy to understand, easily accessible, and available for a long time. In addition, in terms of public objects, on the one hand, the influence scope of the platform's censorship behavior can be considered to determine the public group of the platform, that is, if the platform's censorship behavior only adversely affects specific subjects, the scope of disclosure is limited to relevant a specific subject; [10] On the other hand, information involving business secrets and personal privacy that should not be disclosed to the general public. For example, the algorithmic mechanism for review and processing may only be disclosed to regulatory agencies after being requested by platform operators and reviewed by relevant agencies, and regulatory agencies are responsible for ensuring information security.

4.3. Improve the implementation procedures of the information content review rules

The implementation of online platform information content review rules is mainly reflected in the establishment of an information content review mechanism. Standardizing information content review rules requires it to establish a reasonable and standardized content review mechanism. Article 9 of the "Regulations on the Governance of Online Ecological Content" stipulates that in the ecological governance mechanism of online information content established by online platforms, relevant systems such as information release review, thread comment review, and real-time inspection should be improved. This is the specific requirement of legislators for the establishment of an effective and practical review mechanism for online platforms. my country's content review mechanism is relatively well established, and it should belong to the content review mechanism of the Tik Tok platform. The Tik Tok platform mainly relies on manual review to review illegal and illegal information. It reviews the legitimacy of videos through two channels: platform review at the video upload stage, and user complaints and reports at the video dissemination stage. In the video uploading stage, it is determined whether the video violates regulations and whether it can be published according to the process of automatic review and then manual review; in the complaint reporting stage, the legitimacy of the video is secondarily

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determined based on user complaints and then professional manual review. Tik Tok 's information content review rules are effectively implemented through this mechanism, but there is a lack of corresponding internal supervision procedures, and there is still room for further improvement in this mechanism.

In order to seek further improvement of China's content review mechanism, we can learn from the relevant experience of foreign platforms' content review mechanisms. We can refer to Facebook's content review system to refine the content review mechanism of my country's online platforms. First of all, based on cost considerations, platforms should adopt different auditing methods according to their own needs to audit different levels of information. Facebook's content moderation is divided into three categories: pre-event moderation, post-event active moderation, and post-event reactive manual content moderation. [15]

Based on the consideration of saving the cost of manual review, the pre-audit mainly uses content filtering technology for automatic review, and the post-reactive manual content review adopts manual review. The post-event active review system requires the platform to actively search for and delete illegal information in a timely manner, but limit the illegal information to “extreme information and terrorist information”. That is to say, what Facebook undertakes is a limited censorship obligation, which avoids the platform's burden of censorship. Second, the professionalism of the review team should be enhanced. During Facebook's post-reactive manual review phase, it divides the content review team into three levels: the first level is the rule maker for professionals such as lawyers, who do not participate in the preliminary review work, and only make final decisions based on the important information submitted by the second level reviewers; Level 2 examiners are responsible for overseeing the review work of Level 3 examiners and can prioritize information such as immediate threats of violence or terrorism, and review some general information based on their own needs; The third-level censors do general censorship work and undertake the censorship of lower-priority information content such as insults, pornography and obscenity. In this three-level review system, the first-level reviewer leaves the specific review work and only makes the final decision, which relatively ensures the neutrality of the system established; the limited review of illegal information by the second-level censors can limit the abuse of their censorship power, and their supervision of the third-level censors can effectively guarantee the fairness of the information content review. Chinese online platforms can also establish top-down supervision and review procedures in the information content review mechanism, optimize the quality of the review team, and improve the professionalism and impartiality of the information content review mechanism.

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4. 3. Standardize the notification procedure before the platform makes a decision

In the Internet age, in order to avoid the arbitrary problem of administrative law enforcement, the Cyberspace Administration of China issued the "Procedural Regulations on Administrative Law Enforcement for Internet Information Content Management" to safeguard the procedural rights of online platforms. Under the control of information content review rules, the relationship between online platforms and platform users is similar to the regulatory relationship between administrative agencies and online platforms. However, considering the timeliness of handling illegal information on the Internet platform when making censorship and handling, it often omits the setting of prior procedures, thereby damaging the procedural rights of users.

Establishing a notification procedure before a decision on review and handling is made can effectively protect the procedural rights of users, and is a necessary measure to regulate the power of online platforms. In order to determine the prior notification procedure of the online platform, on the one hand, the specific notification content should be improved. Referring to the requirements for notification in the "The Santa Clara Principles" issued by the Electronic Frontier Foundation, the specific content of the platform notification should at least include the content deleted by the platform, how to review the content, the specific review regulations violated by users, Channels and modalities for grievances, relevant time limits for grievance procedures, and other remedies. [16] In this way, the online platform can further supplement its notification content, and include the specific terms of the violation of the information posted by the user, the platform's review procedures, the user's complaint methods and complaint procedures, and the remedies for platform review errors into the platform's notification content. On the other hand, the network platform should use reasonable notification methods to inform users. The German "Internet Enforcement Act" puts forward the requirements for the disclosure of transparency reports to be simple, easy to understand, easy to obtain and permanently available; Facebook reminds users by issuing a notice of censorship decision when users log in. [15] A reasonable notification method is an inevitable requirement for the platform to improve the notification procedure. Referring to the above experience, the notification method of the online platform should meet the reasonable requirements of being simple and easy to understand, easy to obtain, and timely reminding.

The above procedural requirements for the online platform information content review rules to enhance user participation, make review rules transparent, improve the implementation procedures of the rules, and related procedures before making decisions can be determined by professional organizations, industry associations, super-large platforms, etc. make specific provisions. Other platforms should be applied by reference, and administrative organs may also provide guiding opinions through relevant legal documents. In addition, when the administrative organ supervises the autonomous behavior

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of the platform, it should establish and improve the filing and review system of the platform's review rules, and regard the platform's improvement and practice of the review rules as an important factor in determining whether it actively fulfills its information content review obligations. Based on this, and then decide whether to hold the platform accountable.

5. Conclusion

The online platform has become the main place for the public to participate in online activities. The rules of online platform information content review are the main basis for the platform to manage illegal information. The improvement of this rule will greatly promote the maintenance of platform order and the establishment of a good online ecological environment. It also provides a convenient way to establish a co-governance order with the participation of multiple subjects. The formulation of platform censorship rules is an effective supplement to the legal governance of the network environment, and it is also a practice of comprehensive law-based governance in the internet age. In view of the process of formulating and implementing information content review rules on online platforms, this paper proposes a series of procedural requirements such as strengthening user participation in the establishment of the review mechanism, establishing a transparent mechanism, improving the content review mechanism, and improving the notification procedure before the review and handling decision is made. , which can enhance the authority of platform rules and achieve the purpose of balancing freedom of speech and public order. Of course, we should realize that network environment governance is a long-term topic, and we need to continuously strengthen the improvement of network platform rules, build a benign network ecological environment, and ensure the long-term operation of network co-governance order.

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